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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Denvil R. Hamlin appeals from his judgment of conviction for sexual exploitation
of a vulnerable adult. He asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion to
dismiss because his prosecution for sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult denied him
equal protection under the law and due process.

He further asserts that the district

court erred by failing to suppress statements given in violation of the Fifth Amendment
and by finding him competent to stand trial.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On July 13, 2010, the Mountain Home police responded to a report of possible
sexual abuse and theft. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.2.) The
reporting party was a social worker who worked with William McCormick. (PSI, p.2.)
The social worker assisted Mr. McCormick due to his mental disabilities, which included
schizoaffective disorder and mild mental retardation.

(PSI, p.2.)

The social worker

reported that Mr. McCormick had been sexually abused by Mr. Hamlin.

(PSI, p.2.)

Mr. Hamlin reads at a 3rd grade level and has an IQ of 62. (R., pp.180-81.)
Mr. Hamlin admitted that on one occasion,

he put his hand beneath

Mr. McCormick's pants and touched his penis and that Mr. McCormick touched
Mr. Hamlin's penis over his pants. (PSI, p.2.) On another occasion, at Mr. McCormick's
residence, both Mr. Hamlin and Mr. McCormick pulled their penises out and Mr. Hamlin
put Mr. McCormick's penis in his mouth. (PSI, p.2.) Mr. Hamlin also acknowledged
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having anal sex with Mr. McCormick.

(PSI, p.2.)

Mr. Hamlin believed that

Mr. McCormick wanted to participate in these acts. (PSI, p.2.)
Mr. Hamlin was charged with three counts of sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult.
(R., p.9.) Defense counsel sought a competency evaluation pursuant to I.C. s. 18-211.
(R., pp.17, 19.) 8ased on the report, Mr. Hamlin was found not competent to proceed
and on October 10, 2010, was committed to the Department of Health and Welfare for a
period of time not to exceed 90 days. (R., p.28.) At a status conference two months
later, the court determined that Mr. Hamlin was still not fit to proceed. (R., p.37.) The
magistrate finally found Mr. Hamlin to be competent on April 7, 2011.

(R., p.78.)

Mr. Hamlin was bound over and the Information was filed on July 7, 2011. (R., p.1 09.)
Mr. Hamlin then filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that his prosecution denied
him equal protection of the law pursuant to both the Idaho and United States
Constitutions.

(R., p.116.) An amended motion was then filed, asserting that Idaho

Code § 18-15058(1 )(a) and/or (c) is unconstitutional because the term, "vulnerable
adult," is vague. (R., p.12S.) He then expanded on his equal protection claim, asserting
that the statute denied the equal protection of the law to vulnerable adults, "by grossly
burdening the right of such people to engage in personal relationships of a sexual
nature,

either with

persons

of normal

intelligence

or with

persons

suffering

developmental disabilities or mental retardation." (R., p.126.)
Mr. Hamlin then filed a motion to suppress, asserting that, because he was
"mentally retarded, or a developmentally disabled vulnerable adult," his statements to
authorities were taken in violation of the Fifth Amendment and Article I, Section 13 of
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the Idaho Constitution.

(R., p.130.) Mr. Hamlin also sought the assistance of mental

health expert witnesses to assist him in these motions. (R., p.132.)
Mr. Hamlin then sought another competency evaluation.

(R., p.136.)

He

attached an affidavit in support of Dr. David Sanford in support of both this motion and
the motion to dismiss.

(R., p.138.)

The district court granted the motion for a

competency evaluation. (R., p.169.)
Mr. Hamlin then filed a memorandum in support of his motion to dismiss,
asserting that his prosecution denied him equal protection of the law and his due
process rights.

(R., p.173.)

Mr. Hamlin did not address the previously-raised

vagueness question. (R., p.173.) He then filed a memorandum in support of his motion
to suppress.

(R., p.179.)

In this memorandum, Mr. Hamlin conceded that his

incriminating statements were made knowingly and voluntarily, but asserted that they
were not made intelligently. (R., p.180.) Specifically, Mr. Hamlin asserted that, due to
the fact that he read at a 3rd grade level and had an IQ of 62, he would not have
understood or appreciated the choices available to him regarding his waiver of his Fifth
Amendment rights. (R., pp.180-81.)
Mr. Hamlin then filed a second motion for dismissal of charges based on the
August 24, 2011 competency evaluation.

(R., p.184.)

While this competency

evaluation found Mr. Hamlin "marginally competent to proceed," Dr. Sombke also stated
that Mr. Hamlin did not appear to have the capacity to testify in his own defense.
(R., p.184.)
A hearing was held on October 3, 2011, on Mr. Hamlin's motions. At the hearing,
Kathy Hamlin testified that she was Mr. Hamlin's wife and had a learning disability of her
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own, namely, "that I have trouble reading and figuring out things on my own. Just takes
me a while to comprehend everything." (Tr., pA7, Ls.21-25.) She believed that her
"mental abilities" were about the same as Mr. Hamlin's.

(Tr., pA7, Ls.1-5.) To her

knowledge, no court had ever determined that Mr. Hamlin could not make decisions on
his own. (Tr., pA8, Ls.20-25.)
Dr. Sombke then testified. (Tr., p.52, Ls.10-15.) He testified that, based upon
his August 24, 2011 report, Mr. Hamlin "probably met criteria for competency to proceed
... my only concern that I had for Mr. Hamlin's competency was his ability to testify in
his own defense."

(Tr., p.53, Ls.18-24.)

He believed that Mr. Hamlin would have

difficulty "testifying and not incriminating himself because he doesn't totally understand
a lot of questions that are being asked of him." (Tr., p.54, Ls.6-9.) Mr. Hamlin had a
difficult time explaining what "sexual abuse" meant. (Tr., p.58, LsA-16.) He had a hard
time understanding that the charges were serious. (Tr., p.59, Ls.8-12.) He believed
that Mr. Hamlin may have a hard time understanding a prosecutor's questions and
would have a hard time elaborating on questions, even in his own words. (Tr., p.62, L.8
- p.63, L.5.)
Following questions by the parties, the district court asked Dr. Sombke his
opinion relating to whether Mr. Hamlin could knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligent waive
his Fifth Amendment rights; Dr. Sombke stated, "that's a difficult question, but I - I
would - I do not think that Mr. Hamlin would really understand what he would be
waiving." (Tr., p.71, Ls.16-18.) He elaborated:
You know, if he waived his rights - and he's so agreeable, he could just
say yes to just about everything. So he doesn't want to disagree with
anybody, and if they said, do you understand this? Say yes. Do you waive
you - are you okay with waiving your rights? You just say yes. And then I
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don't think he would really understand what that meant and what he was
really doing.
(Tr., p.71, L.20 - p.72, L.3.)

Dr. Sombke could not recall if he had reviewed the

recording of the interview. (Tr., p.74, Ls.2-4.)
Officer Ty Larsen was the next witness. (Tr., p.77, Ls.1-5.) He testified that he
interviewed Mr. Hamlin in August of 2010.

(Tr., p.78, Ls.16-17.)

Officer Larsen

arranged for the interview; he was unaware of how Mr. Hamlin arrived at the police
station but believed that he was accompanied by his wife. (Tr., p.80, Ls.1-2.) Officer
Larsen never communicated to Mr. Hamlin whether he was free to leave the police
department. (Tr., p.80, Ls.14-20.) He provided Mr. Hamlin with a Miranda rights form,
which Mr. Hamlin signed. (Tr., p.82, Ls.1-9.) During the interview, Officer Larsen never
became concerned that Mr. Hamlin did not understand him or was not responsive to his
questions. (Tr., p.82, Ls.17-25.) Officer Larsen also testified that, in March, 2010, he
interviewed Mr. Hamlin on an unrelated matter and was not concerned that Mr. Hamlin
was unable to understand him. (Tr., p.89, Ls.1-3.) On both occasions Officer Larsen
asked Mr. Hamlin to come to the station and he complied; he was cooperative on both
occasions.

(Tr., p.93, Ls.1-5.)

During the March interview, Mr. Hamlin denied any

criminal culpability, but he made incriminating statements during the August interview.
(Tr., p.93, Ls.1-14.)

Officer Larsen did acknowledge that he knew Mr. Hamlin had

difficulty reading, which is why he read the Miranda form to Mr. Hamlin. (Tr., p.95, LS.725.)
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The district court denied the motions at issue on appeal. 1

(R., p.233.)

Mr. Hamlin then entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving the right to appeal from the
denial of his motions.

(R., p.260.)

The district court imposed consecutive unified

sentences of ten years, with two years fixed, and suspended the sentences and placed
Mr. Hamlin on probation. (R., p.267.) Mr. Hamlin appealed. (R., p.278.) He asserts
that the district court erred by denying his pretrial motions.

The district court granted a motion in limine and delayed ruling on other issues that are
not relevant to the issues on appeal.

1
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Hamlin's motions to dismiss and suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Hamlin's Motions To Dismiss And
Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mr. Hamlin asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss

because his prosecution for sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult denied him equal
protection under the law and due process.

He further asserts that the district court

erred by failing to suppress statements given in violation of the Fifth Amendment and by
finding him competent to stand trial.

B.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Hamlin's Motions To Dismiss And
Suppress

1.

Standard Of Review

The standard of review of a motion to suppress or dismiss is bifurcated. When a
decision on such a motion is challenged, this Court accepts the trial court's findings of
fact which were supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of
constitutional principles to the facts as found. See State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559,
561 (Ct. App. 1996).

2.

Equal Protection

Mr. Hamlin was charged with three counts of sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult;
the relevant statute provides:
It is a felony for any person, with the intent of arousing, appealing to or
gratifying the lust, passion or sexual desires of such person, a vulnerable
adult or a third party, to:
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(a) Commit any lewd or lascivious act or acts upon or with the body or any
part or member thereof of a vulnerable adult including, but not limited
to: genital-genital contact, oral-genital contact, anal-genital contact,
oral-anal contact, manual-anal contact or manual-genital contact,
whether between persons of the same or opposite sex;
(b) Involve a vulnerable adult in any act of bestiality or sadomasochism as
defined in section 18-1507, Idaho Code; or
(c) Cause or have sexual contact with a vulnerable adult, not amounting to
lewd conduct as defined in paragraph (a) of this subsection.
I.C. § 18-15058. "Vulnerable adult" is defined as,
a person eighteen (18) years of age or older who is unable to protect
himself from abuse, neglect or exploitation due to physical or mental
impairment which affects the person's judgment or behavior to the extent
that he lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate
or implement decisions regarding his person, funds, property or resources.
I.C. § 18-1505(4)(e).
With regard to this issue, Mr. Hamlin filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that his
prosecution denied him equal protection of the law pursuant to both the Idaho and
United States Constitutions. (R., p.116.) An amended motion was then filed, asserting
that Idaho Code § 18-15058(1)(a) and/or (c) is unconstitutional because the term,
"vulnerable adult," is vague.

(R., p.125.) He then expanded on his equal protection

claim, asserting that the statute denied the equal protection of the law to vulnerable
adults, "by grossly burdening the right of such people to engage in personal
relationships of a sexual nature, either with persons of normal intelligence or with
persons suffering developmental disabilities or mental retardation." (R., p.126.)
At the hearing, counsel for Mr. Hamlin elaborated on the claim.

First, counsel

expressly withdrew the vagueness claim, asserting, "we do not, in fact, present a void
for vagueness argument." (Tr., p.103, Ls.21-23.) However, counsel asserted that the
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statute was "overbroad" by its use of the word, "any person."

(Tr., p.104, Ls.5-7.)

Counsel explained:
The statute creates classification. The statute and the definitional portions
of that particular chapter defines vulnerable adult. This class of person,
because of the language of the statute, may not, without actual
commission of a felony, a vulnerable adult may not engage another
vulnerable adult or anybody else in sexual contact. Forbidden. It's a
felony. If the other person initiates, no matter what their status is, sexual
contact with a vulnerable adult, they're guilty of a felony. The vulnerable
adult, assuming it's consensual and the State concedes the conduct here
is consensual in its pleadings - this makes the vulnerable adult an
accomplice to the act. ... The language of the statute makes sexual
relations between vulnerable adults and persons of normal intelligence a
felony without exception. That's - that classification is created by the
Idaho Legislature.
No other group that I know of in Idaho has been deprived of their right to
engage in sexual contact and sexual conduct with another person. No
other class of person is this a felony offense.
(Tr., p.104, L.15 - p.106, L.2.) Thus, the issue presented to the court was that equal
protection was implicated because the legislature had created a class of citizen who
had been deprived of their right to engage in sexual conduct.
When presented with an equal protection argument, this Court identifies the
classification under attack, articulates the standard under which the classification will be
tested, and then determines whether the standard has been satisfied. Coghlan v. Beta

Thera Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 395 (1999).

Different levels of scrutiny apply to

equal protection challenges. When considering the Fourteenth Amendment, strict
scrutiny applies to fundamental rights and suspect classes; intermediate scrutiny
applies to classifications involving gender and illegitimacy; and rational basis scrutiny
applies to all other challenges.
(1998).

Meisner v. Pot/ach Corp., 131 Idaho 258, 261-62

For analyses made under the Idaho Constitution, slightly different levels of
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scrutiny apply. Strict scrutiny, as under federal law, applies to fundamental rights and
suspect classes. Id. at 261.

Means-focus scrutiny, unlike the federal intermediate

scrutiny, is employed "where the discriminatory character of a challenged statutory
classification is apparent on its face and where there is also a patent indication of a lack
of relationship between the classification and the declared purpose of the statute."
Coghlan, 133 Idaho at 395 (quoting Jones v. State Bd. of Med., 97 Idaho 859, 871
(1976». Rational basis scrutiny applies to all other challenges. See Coghlan, 133 Idaho
at 395.
Under the strict scrutiny standard of review, a law which infringes on a
fundamental right will be upheld only where the State can demonstrate the law is
necessary to promote a compelling state interest. Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for Term
Limits, 135 Idaho 121, 126 (2000). To pass strict scrutiny, a law "must be narrowly
tailored to further a legitimate and compelling governmental interest and must be the
least restrictive means available to vindicate that interest." Finch v. Commonwealth
Health Ins. Connector Auth., 959 N.E.2d 970, 975 (Mass. 2012). A classification will
pass rational basis review if it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose
and "if there is any conceivable state of facts which will support it." Meisner, 131 Idaho
at 262 (quoting Bint v. Creative Forest Prods., 108 Idaho 116,120 (1985».
Mr. Hamlin acknowledges that, generally speaking, vulnerable adults are not a
suspect class and, therefore, rational basis review would apply to such a classification.
However, as the right denied vulnerable adults is the right to engage in consensual
sexual activity, and because that activity has been deemed a fundamental right by the
United States Supreme Court, see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), strict
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scrutiny should apply. In his memorandum, Mr. Hamlin acknowledged, "the State has a
distinct interest in avoiding the exploitation of the weak and vulnerable, sexually or
otherwise. However, the statute, by its terms, grossly burdens the class by abolishing
their legal ability to have sexual relations with anyone."

(R., p.175.)

Mr. Hamlin

contended, "the legal elimination of all sexual activity by vulnerable adults is
unnecessary to the State's interest in their protection." (R., p.175.) Mr. Hamlin admitted
that Mr. McCormick was a vulnerable adult and asserted that he had also been
classified as a vulnerable adult. (R., p.173.)
Thus, in this case, Mr. Hamlin asserted that the State was criminalizing
consensual sexual behavior between vulnerable adults.

A vulnerable adult is not

defined as a person lacking the ability to consent to sexual activity.

See I.C. § 18-

1505(4)(e). It is defined as a person "unable to protect himself from abuse, neglect or
exploitation .... " Id. The law in this case is not narrowly tailored; First, as noted by
Mr. Hamlin in the district court, it applies to "any person," not to a person who is not a
vulnerable adult. I.C. § 18-15058. Further, the statute does not require any allegation
of force or a lack of consent. And the charging document in this case alleges neither
force nor lack of consent. (R., p.109.)
In denying this claim, the district court held that a vulnerable adult was, "in a
practical sense," someone who lacked the capacity to legally consent.

(R., p.238.)

However, as set forth above, the statute does not define a vulnerable adult as one who
lacks the ability to consent to sexual activity. The court noted that Mr. Hamlin asserted
that he was a vulnerable adult, and "hence, the argument goes that because Hamlin is
claimed to be a vulnerable adult that he is being treated differently than a victim who is
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a vulnerable adult and, therefore, there is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Constitution."

(R., p.239.)

The court then concluded that protecting a narrowly

defined class from harm by others does not implicate a suspect class or violate a
fundamental right. (R., p.239.)
However, the court did not address what rational basis there would be to charge
one vulnerable with a crime and not the other if indeed Mr. Hamlin and Mr. McCormick
were two vulnerable adults. Mr. Hamlin submits that in such a situation there would be
no rational basis to make such a distinction and therefore charging one vulnerable over
the other would not pass even rational basis review.

Further, as set forth above,

because the statute has the effect of denying the right to engage in sexual activity to an
entire class of individuals, strict scrutiny is the proper standard of review and the district
court erred by applying the incorrect standard.

3.

Due Process

In his memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss for a due process
violation, Mr. Hamlin asserted, "the fact of the matter is that both parties in the present
case engaged in consensual sexual conduct and both are mildly mentally retarded.
They should stand on an equal footing before the law and it is constitutionally
inappropriate to apply the statute to the facts of the present case."

(R., p.177.)

Mr. Hamlin asserts that, by criminalizing consensual sexual conduct, the statute is
unconstitutional as it is applies to this case.
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that the "landmark case of
Lawrence v. Texas[, 539 U.S. 558 (2003),] legalized the practice of homosexuality and
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in essence made it a protected practice under the Due Process Clause of the United
States Constitution." McGriff v. McGriff, 140 Idaho 642, 648 (2004) (citation omitted).
In Lawrence, the Court invalidated a Texas statute "making it a crime for two
persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct." Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 562. The statute outlawed "deviate sexual intercourse" between members of the
same sex, specifically oral and anal sex. Id. at 563. The Court resolved the issue by
determining whether the defendants "were free as adults to engage in the private
conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution." Id. at 564. The Court acknowledged that "[t]here are
broad statements of the substantive reach of liberty under the Due Process Clause" in
previous cases. Id. (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965».

While Griswold is the most well-known example of the Court declaring a right to
privacy encompassed in the Due Process Clause, the Lawrence Court recognized that,
"[a]fter Griswold, it was established that the right to make certain decisions regarding
sexual conduct extends beyond the marital relationship."

Id. at 565.

Thus, in

Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court invalidated a law prohibiting the distribution of

contraceptives to unmarried persons. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438, 453-454 (1972). The
Eisenstadt Court stated:

It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the
marital relationship. . .. If the right to privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether or bear or beget a child.
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Id. at 453. As the Lawrence Court observed, "the reasoning of Griswold could not be

confined to the protection of rights of married adults." Lawrence, 558 U.S. at 566.
While the Court did not confine the right to privacy of the Due Process Clause to
married couples, for a time it did confine that right to heterosexual couples. Thus, in
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the Court upheld a statute making it a crime

to engage in sodomy. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190. In Lawrence, the Court reconsidered
the ruling in Bowers and expressed concern that the statutes in question "do seek to
control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the
law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals."
Lawrence, 558 U.S. at 567. According to Lawrence:

It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this
relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and
still retain their dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds overt
expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can
be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The
liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the
right to make this choice.
Id. (emphasis added).

In light of Lawrence, there is no distinction between sexual acts practiced
between married couples and homosexual couples, for after Lawrence, "[t]he petitioners
are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence
or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to
liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct
without intervention of the government." Lawrence, 558 U.S. at 578.
Mr. Hamlin clearly asserted that the conduct in this case was consensual.

(R., p.177.) The district court denied this claim based on State v. Cook, 146 Idaho 261
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(Ct. App. 2008), and its conclusion that the statutory scheme was designed to prohibit
sexual contact with vulnerable adults as that term was defined, not sexual contact
between consenting adults in general.

(R., p.239.) In Cook, the defendant asserted

that his prosecution for the infamous crime against nature was unconstitutional in light
of Lawrence. Cook, 146 Idaho at 262. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant
had failed to meet his burden because, "Cook has not shown that he was prosecuted for
contact that occurred in private and with an adult who could and did consent." Id. at
264. Here, however, Mr. Hamlin specifically asserted that the conduct was consensual
and there is no dispute that it was private. Mr. Hamlin therefore asserts that the district
court erred by denying his motion to dismiss on this basis.

4.

Miranda

Any waiver of Miranda rights or the underlying constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination must be made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. State v. Alger,
115 Idaho 42, 45 (Ct.App.1988). The state bears the burden of demonstrating that an
individual has knowingly,

voluntarily,

and

intelligently waived

his

rights by a

preponderance of the evidence. State v. Doe, 131 Idaho 709,712 (Ct. App. 1998). An
appellate review of this waiver issue encompasses the totality of the circumstances.

State v. Johnson, 126 Idaho 859, 863 (Ct. App. 1995); Alger, 115 Idaho at 46.

A

notification of rights form is not conclusive evidence of waiver. See State v. Kirkwood,
111 Idaho 623,625 (1986).
In his memorandum in support of his motion to suppress, Mr. Hamlin conceded
that his incriminating statements were made knowingly and voluntarily, but asserted that
they were not made intelligently. (R., p.180.) Specifically, Mr. Hamlin asserted that,
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due to the fact that he reads at a 3rd grade level and has an IQ of 62, he would not have
understood or appreciated the choices available to him regarding his waiver of his Fifth
Amendment rights. (R., pp.180-81.)
The district court denied the motion on the basis that Mr. Hamlin was not in
"custody" for purposes of Miranda and that Mr. Hamlin had been properly advised of his

Miranda rights.

(R., p.236.)

Specifically, the district court noted that Mr. Hamlin

voluntarily appeared at the police station; Detective Larsen read Mr. Hamlin his Miranda
warnings and Mr. Hamlin stated he understood; Detective Larsen was in plain clothes;
the interview was not hostile or threatening; Mr. Hamlin was not restrained or prevented
from leaving; and Detective Larsen did not communicate his intent to arrest Mr. Hamlin
until the very end of the interview. (R., p.236.)
Mr. Hamlin first asserts that the district court erred by determining that he was
not in custody. An objective test is used to determine whether a person was in custody
when questioning occurred. State v. James, 148 Idaho 574, 577 (2010). The relevant
inquiry is how a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have understood the
situation. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984); James, 148 Idaho at 577.
The first step is to determine whether an individual's freedom of movement was
curtailed. Howes v. Fields, _U.S. _ , _ , 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1189 (2012). This
inquiry, however, is only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for Miranda custody.

Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, _ , 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1224 (2010); State v. Hurst,
151 Idaho 430, 436 (Ct. App. 2011). Thus, routine traffic stops and other investigative
detentions pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), do not implicate Miranda even
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though the detained persons are not free to leave during the stop. Berkemer, 468 U.S.
at 440.
This Court considers all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.
Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994); James, 148 Idaho at 577, 225 P.3d

at 1172. This generally involves a consideration of whether the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation have created a "police-dominated atmosphere," and
whether the circumstances involve the type of '''inherently compelling pressures' that
are often present when a suspect is yanked from familiar surroundings in the outside
world and subjected to interrogation in a police station." Howes, _

U.S. at _ , 132 S.

Ct. at 1191 (quoting Shatzer, 559 U.S. at _ , 130 S. Ct. at 1219 ). Specific factors to
be considered may include the degree of restraint on the person's freedom of
movement including whether the person is placed in handcuffs, whether the subject is
informed that the detention is more than temporary, the location and visibility of the
interrogation, whether other persons were present, the number of questions asked, the
duration of the interrogation or detention, the time of the interrogation, the number of
officers present, the number of officers involved in the interrogation, the conduct of the
officers, and the nature and manner of the questioning. See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 43542. The burden of showing custody rests on the defendant seeking to exclude evidence
based on a failure to administer Miranda warnings. James, 148 Idaho at 577, 225 P.3d
at 1172.
Mr. Hamlin acknowledges that he drove to the interview, but it was Detective
Larsen that arranged for the meeting. (Tr., p.80, Ls.1-2.) Thus, it was not as though
Mr. Hamlin simply volunteered to show up at the police station.
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Further, Detective

Larsen never communicated to Mr. Hamlin whether he was free to leave the police
department. (Tr., p.80, Ls.14-20.) He also provided Mr. Hamlin with a Miranda rights
form, something he would not be required to do if the interrogation was not custodial.
(Tr., p.82, Ls.1-9.) Thus, Mr. Hamlin asserts that, because the Detective arranged the
meeting, did not tell him he was free to leave, and read him his Miranda warnings, that
he was in custody for purposes of Miranda.
Further, the district court held that, because Detective Larsen provided Miranda
warnings,

the

statements were

knowingly,

intelligently,

and

voluntarily made.

(R., p.236.) However, as set forth above, written Miranda warnings are not conclusive
proof of waiver. See State v. Kirkwood, 111 Idaho 623, 625 (1986).
During the suppression hearing, the district court asked Dr. Sombke his opinion
relating to whether Mr. Hamlin could knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligent waive his
Fifth Amendment rights; Dr. Sombke stated, "that's a difficult question, but I - I would - I
do not think that Mr. Hamlin would really understand what he would be waiving."
(Tr., p.71, Ls.16-18.) He elaborated:
You know, if he waived his rights - and he's so agreeable, he could just
say yes to just about everything. So he doesn't want to disagree with
anybody, and if they said, do you understand this? Say yes. Do you waive
you - are you okay with waiving your rights? You just say yes. And then I
don't think he would really understand what that meant and what he was
really doing.
(Tr., p.71, L.20 - p.72, L.3.) Mr. Hamlin acknowledges that, on the recording of the
interview, Mr. Hamlin is cooperative and appears to understand the questions. (See
State's Exhibit 100.)

However, this should not be particularly surprising given

Dr. Sombke's diagnosis - Mr. Hamlin comes across as "agreeable" and wanting to be
cooperative. Considering Dr. Sombke's testimony that it was unlikely that Mr. Hamlin
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would understand what he was waiving, coupled with Mr. Hamlin's mild mental
retardation, Mr. Hamlin asserts that his statements were not intelligently made, and,
therefore, the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress on this basis.

5.

Competency

Idaho Code §§ 18-210 and 18-211 provide guidance on when a defendant may
be tried and when a mental evaluation is required. Idaho Code § 18-210 provides that,
U[n]o person who as a result of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to understand
the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense shall be tried, convicted,
sentenced or punished for the commission of an offense so long as such incapacity
endures." I.C. § 18-210. Further, the standard to be met before a mental evaluation of
a defendant is required is set forth in Idaho Code § 18-211:
Whenever there is reason to doubt the defendant's fitness to proceed as
set forth in section 18-210, Idaho Code, the court shall appoint at least
one (1) qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist or shall request the
director of the department of health and welfare to designate at least one
(1) qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to examine and report
upon the mental condition of the defendant to assist counsel with defense
or understand the proceedings.
I.C. § 18-211.
The test to determine whether a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial is
whether the defendant has a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him and whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding to assist in
preparing his defense. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (holding petitioner
had an intellectual understanding of the charges against him but his impaired sense of
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reality substantially undermined his judgment and prevented him from cooperating
rationally with his lawyer); Stone v. State, 132 Idaho 490, 492 (Ct. App. 1999).
The district court must conduct a competency hearing whenever the evidence
before the judge raises a bona fide doubt about the defendant's competence to stand
trial. A bona fide doubt exists if there is substantial evidence of incompetence.
Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 603-04 (9th Cir. 2004). Although no particular
facts signal a defendant's incompetence, suggestive evidence includes the defendant's
demeanor before the court, irrational behavior of the defendant, and available medical
evaluations of the defendant's competence to stand trial. Drape v. Missouri, 420 U.S.
162,180 (1975).
In this case, Dr. Sombke testified that, based upon his August 24, 2011 report,
Mr. Hamlin "probably met criteria for competency to proceed ... my only concern that I
had for Mr. Hamlin's competency was his ability to testify in his own defense."
(Tr., p.53, Ls.18-24.) He believed that Mr. Hamlin would have difficulty "testifying and
not incriminating himself because he doesn't totally understand a lot of questions that
are being asked of him." (Tr., p.54, Ls.6-9.) Mr. Hamlin had a difficult time explaining
what "sexual abuse" meant. (Tr., p.58, LsA-16.) He had a hard time understanding
that the charges were serious.

(Tr., p.59, Ls.8-12.)

Dr. Sombke believed that

Mr. Hamlin may have a hard time understand a prosecutor's questions and would have
a hard time elaborating on questions, even in his own words. (Tr., p.62, L.8 - p.63,
L.5.) In his report, Dr. Sombke believed that Mr. Hamlin was incapable of testifying in
his own defense. (R., p.192.)
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The district court denied this motion on the basis that Mr. Hamlin had previously
been found competent, and "whether the Defendant would be as sophisticated a
witness as some may wish is not determinative." (R., p.240.)
Mr. Hamlin acknowledges that he had previously been found competent to
proceed and that Dr. Sombke found him "marginally competent," but Mr. Hamlin submits
that, based on this record, the district court erred by determining that Mr. Hamlin was
competent because a person who cannot competently testify cannot consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding to assist in preparing his
defense. In a case like this, where there are only two witnesses to any alleged criminal
conduct, the defendant and the alleged victim, the ability to testify in one's own defense
is paramount. It is about the only way to rebut the charge. Mr. Hamlin therefore asserts
that the district court erred by determining he was competent because he would not
have been able to assist in his own defense.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Hamlin respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction
and that his case be remanded for further proceedings.
DATED this 20 th day of June, 2013.
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